The 1940s -mid-1960s saw rapid developments in the chemical and cellulose industries internationally. In this period, a number of attempts to introduce new technologies were taken by industrial scientists and engineers, some of which happened in different countries simultaneously. In the late 1930s, Swedish engineer Johan Richter proposed the Kamyr digester project to industrialists, and after roughly ten years it succeeded in implementing the technology at an industrial scale. Several years earlier, Soviet engineer Leonid Zherebov proposed a project different from the Swedish one in some technical parameters, but with the same purposeincreasing the production of pulp. This initiative, however, was not introduced as planned.
Introduction
In February 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev initiated the de-Stalinization of Soviet society with his secret speech at the twentieth congress of the Communist Party. Several months later, the retired colonel Pravdenko, who was also trained as an engineer, sent a letter to a member of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party Mikhail Pervukhin. He said: "It is really depressing to realize that our Soviet industry is not capable of producing good tables, beds that will not creak at night, comfortable houses and other things." In his letter, he referred to Pervukhin`s presentation at the Congress, where he supported Khrushchev and criticized deficiencies in the organization of Soviet industry. Pravdenko stressed that the problem rested with a disorganized and irresponsible Soviet research and development sector. His observations were based on his experience with military aviation research and development. When it became possible to voice critiques, following Khrushchev's straightforward criticism of Stalin`s totalitarian rule, Pravdenko complained that scientists did not take care of launching innovations, but rather tried to conduct their research formally and just spend the money allocated by the state to research. 3 There were, however, separate inventors who had motivation but suffered from a lack of financial and intellectual support opportunities to implement their ideas. Many talented innovators tabled their groundbreaking ideas due to a lack of state or industry support. Indeed, as the historian of technology Loren Graham has recently shown, Russian and Soviet history witnessed a lot of inspired innovators. However, such figures as Popov, Cherepanov, Prokhorov, Lebedev -people who developed the radio, steam engine, laser and computer -are not widely known for their inventions, since they were not transformed into successful industrial products.
Instead, the Soviet state purchased analogous inventions from abroad or transferred foreign (primarily, Western) technologies in order to imitate and launch their own production. 4 In the 1920s, philosopher Oswald Schpengler wrote, "The economic organizer, factory manager, engineer, inventor -these are not Russian types… Machine industry is its very nature "un-Russian" and will always be foreign to the Russians as something sinful." 5 However, the following history shows that there were many engineers and inventors, and during its history the Soviet government encouraged workers and engineers to engage in invention and rationalization. 6 Moreover, under communism, Russian industry experienced rapid development, 3 Pis`mo leitenanta-inzhenera Pravdenko M. Pervukhinu (Letter by engineer lieutenant Pravdenko to M. Pervukhin)// RGAE (Russian State Archive of the Economy). F. 8513. Op. 1. D. 232. L. 101-105. 4 Graham, Lonely Ideas. 5 Schpengler, 'Das Doppelantlitz Russlands und die Deutsche Ostprobleme', 13-14. 6 Schattenberg, "Stalins Ingenieure. Lebenswelten zwischen Technik und Terror in den 1930er Jahren". and the Soviet regime was associated with quick industrialization and industrial projects on a large scale. Many innovators offered solutions to overcome critical problems in different technological systems -for example, improving separate parts in machinery or increasing the production of important materials. In the process of industrialization and modernization, a number of innovations were encouraged by the Soviet state, and these triggered the development of Soviet science and technology. But only few of them were successful projects -ideas which resulted in formidable technological discoveries and production, as in the case of Sergey Korolev and space engineering or Mikhail Kalashnikov and his assault rifle. Based on these examples, some historians have argued that mostly military projects supported by the state were able to succeed, since the state assessed research potential, finances and strict control and, thus, helped innovators (or even forced) them to build research teams and finally achieve success. 7 Indeed, the military sector was a rather unique field in the Soviet government: it had both financial support and coercion stemming from militarized Soviet foreign policy. Still, in the non-military sphere, there were innovators who were supported by the state but failed to introduce their ideas successfully, and instead they were forced to use foreign technology.
In order to comprehend the reasons why Soviet innovators failed, historians have offered various explanations. Kendall Bailes was among the first to pay attention to this question, and
argued that "the barriers to successful innovation in terms of social relations of the technostructure [existed] both internally and in its dealing with other major groups of Soviet society." 8 She listed a comprehensive set of problems with technological innovations in the Stalinist period, such as an urgent need to adapt foreign technologies, the lack of competition, terror against some innovators, the ideological goal of stimulating technological innovation not only by intelligentsia, but by workers as well, the scarcity of skilled workers, the strong tradition of pure research, the organizational split between research, development and product, and, finally, weak influence of economists in innovations. The main reason, however, was found in the imbalance between production and industrial research, as many scientists conducted fundamental investigations which had a little connection with the practical industrial sector.
Some of them presented double identity -they claimed to be in tune with the aims of the Soviet state, which often implied adopting Western technologies, and at the same time pursued their own interests.
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Adopting Western technologies as the easiest way to modernize and as evidence of Soviet path dependence was stressed by Anthony Sutton, the author of a monumental book on Soviet The discovery of continuous pulp cooking was closely connected with the rapid development of the chemical and construction industries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The invention of new chemicals enabled producers to manufacture new types of cellulose and, as a consequence, produce various types of paper and cardboard. In the 1920s and 1930s and in particular during and after the Second World War, the cellulose industry in many countries was developed intensively. Prior to WWII, there were revolutionary initiatives to improve complicated bleaching and washing technologies for cellulose. Following the war, the industry saw changes in the automation of technological processes and in technology. As a result, in the post-war years, the output of the pulp and paper industry increased radically. 18 Put simply, better organization and technology allowed for the production of whiter and firmer paper and cardboard, and more of the qualified pulp required for other industries, such as food, textiles, and the military. Developing new types of pulp and paper, as well as increasing their quality, were the consequence of societal change and expanding consumer demands. Thus, in the early twentieth century pulp, was in demand to manufacture paper for a society with a rapidly expanding literate population and growing print industry. The world wars opened up new opportunities as the military became a significant consumer of pulp, required for the making of ammunition, gun powder, and rubber for aviation.
In the first half of the twentieth century, pulp cooking was the basic method used to transform wood chips (wood run through a shredder) into pulp in a digester, and was universally done by batch method. As a result, only a certain amount of pulp could be cooked, as the digester worked for several hours to complete all the stages of cooking in sequence. Generally, this method was not economical, was time-consuming, and had a negative impact on the quality of pulp mass. In addition, after each batch cooked, the digester -a complicated and expensive apparatus -required basic maintenance and more often broke down. The problems associated with this method were quite obvious, and industrial scientists in several countries put in considerable effort to develop more functional systems. Batch cooking, thus, was a critical problem which hampered the development of the whole technological system.
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However, the existing equipment could not continuously cook wood chips into pulp, since the digesters designed for batch preparation could not operate all the stages of cooking process at once. Overcoming the critical problem meant inventing a new digester that could cook pulp faster. In the early 1930s, engineers in several countries began to develop such a construction and to work on changing the existing method of pulp making into a more efficient version by introducing continuous cooking. Unlike batch cooking, the new method allowed for nonstop cooking with the steady and simultaneous addition of wood chips and unloading of finished pulp mass. The goal was to make the process of cooking pulp easier and faster, transforming chips into pulp in a matter of minutes. 20 The first attempts were made in Sweden and the Soviet Union, followed by imitations and the development already-in-use (Swedish) technology in Finland, USA, Canada, and Australia.
In the first part of the article, I will give a brief overview of how continuous cooking was 
Successful story

Continuous pulp cooking in Sweden and other countries
If one comes to a cellulose factory or research institute in Europe or the United States and pronounce the name of Johan Richter, any experienced engineer will say that he was the father of the modern cellulose industry. Richter was a Norwegian-born engineer and an inventor of the continuous pulp cooking method. His success began with another innovation -the invention of bleaching pulp by continuous process, which made it easier to refine cooked wood chips and produce whiter pulp. This bleached pulp was an important material, and allowed for the production of better-quality paper and other cellulose-based products.
In Toivanen, Learning and Corporate Strategy, 209. sufficient to change the industry, but rather required further development of the technology over the next ten years. Answering the skepticism of other specialists, Richter said that "People used to ask the same question when we started to make bleaching continuous, and look what they are buying now, all of them." 24 Indeed, despite the small capacity and a number of critical problems in the construction, the digester was a promising innovation in pulp production. In the context of increasing need for pulp by different industries, the continuous method seemed to be an important technology. In the late 1940s -mid 1950s several companies from different countries purchased the Kamyr`s apparatus. Scientists and industrialists in other countries continued improving the digester, often in contact with Kamyr. To some extent, perfecting continuous cooking was a collective effort, as many industrialists worked together on improvements. Others tried to work by their own, based on a purchased digester and aimed to create similar appliances.
Thus, there were later attempts to launch an analogous innovation, undertaken by American Condat. 26 The main technical problem in the construction of the digester was the heating system, since the apparatus had to work at high temperature without stopping to cool. Another Finnish company Ahlström OY which had been a partner of Kamyr conducted similar experiments and offered its solution to the problem. 27 These experiments helped invent the cold blow, to cool the pulp while washing debris from the cooked mass. Later, a Canadian mill in Port-Melon launched a digester with another method called "Hi-Heat Washing" that also solved the problem with heating. In total, accumulated experience lead to the diffusion of improvements to different aspects of one technology. As Sven Rydhom, an engineer who conducted the experiment at the 
Soviet experiments Leonid Zherebov and his method of cooking cellulose
In 1956, Soviet writer Vladimir Dudintsev published his widely famous "Not by Bread
Alone" which told about engineer Lopatkin who tried to launch the production of pipes for the chemical industry, -an unprecedented invention, but one faced with hostility and an impenetrable bureaucracy. 31 The hero of this paper -Leonid Petrovich Zherebov faced different conditions, gaining the support of the government and state industrial leadership in his attempt to implement his invention, continuous cooking of pulp. This project was developed slightly earlier than the similar innovation by Richter, and seems to have emerged in isolation from the Swedish experiments.
Zherebov was born in tsarist Russia in 1863. He graduated from Moscow University and gained his first professional experience at a paper factory in Kamensk, and afterwards worked as a director of this enterprise. Some years later he continued his education at the Moscow Higher Technical School, moving away from practical work as he devoted his time to theoretical examinations of timber as a material for producing of paper and pulp. Indeed, Zherebov developed different aspects of wood chemistry, and found extensive use for wood in industrial productions, among other accomplishments. One of his major and well known inventions was a method for the continuous cooking of pulp, which he proposed in the late 1920s -early 1930s. This was a period when the Soviet government tried to launch new technologies and industries, as well as significantly increase the production of pulp and paper.
While the same search was happening in other counties, in the USSR the problem of pulp production was considered urgent on the state level. Despite huge forests, the Soviet pulp and paper industry processed only five percent of cut trees while the American industry used 35 and Canadian 40 percent of wood. 36 In the late 1920s, some large pulp and paper-making plants were constructed (for example in Kondopoga in the North-Western part of the country), but their capacity was not enough. The need to increase the output of pulp-based products was clearly articulated as a priority for the economic development of the country. 38 However, because the war caused a significant damage and the Finns evacuated most of their machinery (which was returned gradually after the war), the annexation did not bring an automatic improvement of the Soviet pulp and paper industry.
Zherebov`s method of continuous cooking have been appropriate for intensification of pulp production and met the requirements of the day. His innovation was in moving raw materials through the digester from top to bottom, with the ability to regulate the temperature of cooking throughout the whole height of the apparatus. Like Richter`s construction, Zherebov`s digester enabled fast production and high-quality pulp. Both new digesters would be easier to operate, while investments to produce pulp would be lower. In addition, last but not least, the hidden meaning of this innovation, in particular in the Soviet context, might be connected with military purposes, namely for production of ammunition. This aim was not explicitly articulated in the sources I had, and it is more probable that historians can reveal this information from classified documents in later research.
The key difference in two inventions was technical, related to the time of mass moving through the digester. Union after the Finnish-Soviet war in 1944. This plant was chosen because of its capacity and comparatively modern equipment, as the former owner of the plant -Finnish company EnsoGutzeit OY -completed a basic renovation of the facilities shortly before the war. As a result, in the late 1930s, it was the largest producer of pulp in Europe, and its machines were among the most modernized on the continent. It was the most updated plant in the Soviet Union, despite all new enterprises constructed in the previous decade.
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The responsibilities for introducing continuous cooking were put on the local administration. However, in post-war Enso, the intentions of Moscow did not produce strong enthusiasm, since they required as finding qualified engineers and proper raw materials. After Concerning technical expertise, there was a technical college founded in Svetogorsk, the settlement nearby (later, an industrial town), but teaching required skilled professionals. Most lecturers came from the enterprise and university establishments in Leningrad, the city that also delivered newly minted engineers to the plant. In this sense, Leningrad with its industrial base was considered a center compared to the peripheral Enso/Svetogorsk. The local engineers, in particular those who worked in the scientific-technical society (nauchno-tekhnicheskoe obschestvo) had some ties with Leningrad`s organizations, for example the All-Union Institute of
Paper. Such establishments were voluntary organizations in many plants with a general aim of assisting in technological progress and improving production. However, the society of Enso/Svetogorsk is rarely present in the factor's records, and it is probable that its role was minor. In plant`s entire archival collection, I found only a few reports of this organization devoted to the separate aspects of pulp and paper production. It is also remarkable that Zherebov 46 Laine, 'Modernization in the 1940s and 1950s in the Part of Karelia that Was Annexed from Finland on 13 March 1940', 29. 47 Vybor obosnovania konstruktsi i tipov vysokoproizvoditel`nogo oborudovania dlia proizvodstva polutsellulozy i tsellulozy iz trostnika (Choosing the construction and types of highly-efficient equipment for making semi-pulp and pulp from reeds)// RGAE. F. 9480. Op. 3. D. 1178. L. 68-69. did not teach in Svetogorsk, nor did he come to the plant frequently. I could not find any sign of his presence in the local materials, which might be explained by his age (in 1947 he already was 84 years old), other personal reasons, or his devotion to very theoretical work. Again, the main task of practical implementation was given to local engineers and also to specialists who worked on Zherebov's research board, which took control over implementation.
The main reason of why the project was not introduced in 1947 as was initially planned in the decree of the Ministry was due to a lack of technical specifications and equipment. The
Ministry board blamed the factory's leadership, claiming that they had an irresponsible attitude towards the project, i.e. "the most significant innovation of the Soviet science." In addition, the head of the Central Administration of the Sulphite Cellulose Industry (which was a body in the Ministry responsible for implementing the method) Malytin wrote to the head of the plant Sergey
Puzyrev that "to a large extent, the delay in implementation of continuous pulp cooking is happening because of you." Malytin specified that Puzyrev did "not take any concrete measures to order the equipment." 48 Puzyrev explained that he was not able to find the appropriate technical parts as they were not produced in the Soviet Union and it was impossible to purchase them from abroad. In fact, the factory requested permission to import appropriate equipment from Finland, which had tight trade connections with the Soviet Union despite the Cold War.
However, purchasing parts from abroad was not a simple task and required involvement of the State Committee on Science and Technology of the Soviet Union and organizations of foreign trade. Moreover, finding the parts required identifying appropriate suppliers by examining foreign professional literature, addressing those engineers who went abroad for research trips or requesting foreign companies, and finally negotiating with foreign partners on the inter-state level. Getting parts thus included all levels of the government and negotiating, then waiting for the parts to be delivered according to the specifics of trade treaties. In total, all these stages meant ordering equipment and could take several years.
I could not find any data about where the technical parts were received from exactly, although there were a number of supplies of foreign equipment to the Enso plant. The local acts on deliveries of foreign equipment are quite fragmentary and do not always indicate the country of origin. There were, however, mechanisms for cooking and washing of pulp which appeared in the documentation of accepted equipment. 49 Only in 1950 were the tools for an experimental digester received, but their launch was delayed because there were necessary parts missing, in particular high-heat pumps. In October 1950, the Minister issued a new decree where he complained that the work of implementing continuous pulp cooking was being fulfilled at an "impossibly slow pace". 50 The head of the plant Alexander Sil`chenko, who succeeded Puzyrev, said that "the plant was not blame." He specified that there was now a problem with expertise, as the skilled engineers in the plant as well as the workers lacked training in continuous cooking and simply did not know what to do with the new equipment. 51 Another difficulty was in the lack of raw materials or chipped wood of proper quality. In addition, an anonymous report on Zherebov`s digester observed that "there was no any sign of motivated research." 52 The document argued that there was no research plan, and, as a result, the cooker was not discussed
anywhere. At the same time, there was another reason of why just a few people worked on the project. As engineers worked in the group on continuous cooking complained, "The digester was a secret project, and it was not discussed widely by other researchers. There was a narrow circle of people who solved all the questions." 53 Indeed, in trying to launch a revolutionary technology, the Ministry leadership was eager to keep the digester a secret. This might explain why even despite having no resources for the development of the technology, the Ministry did not seek foreign expertise openly. Instead, during the first three years of the project, all responsibility was put on domestic potential -specifically, on a small group of engineers working in the plant. It included at least the head of the plant and the chief engineer as well as a few other engineers specialized in pulp cooking processes.
The group had connections with the Zherebov`s development laboratory in Moscow which was mostly dealing with theoretical improvements to the initial project. In the early 1950s, a specialist from the laboratory Khutolev came to the plant, but his participation, as some local engineers complained, was not active enough. 54 In the same year, the administration of the plant initiated an agreement with the Leningrad branch of the Research Institute of Chemical Machinery in order to find help in implementing Zherebov`s project. However, engineers of the plant were refused, as the institute said that they did not have specialists able to fulfill the task. should have been in the institute's collection. 59 The answer from Puzyrev was rather astonishing; he indicated that there was translation of a paper by Richter and Otto on continuous cooking, but the relevant literature could not be sent. The reason, Puzyrev explained, was that the work required was only a single copy, while all the typewriters were busy and could not make a copy. 60 As a result, it was only possible to read the book in the reading room of the library instead. I cannot say if Sil`chenko finally found the articles elsewhere or managed to get a copy 57 There were more indications about these obstacles in communication between research and industry. Thus, Kamsky paper plant had been initially constructed on the basis of plans proposed by Giprobumthe head institution to construct industrial objects in the Soviet Union. However, as the first head of the plant M. Eliashberg said, in this plan there were many significant mistakes. While constructing, even though some basic constructions were already made, while implementing the offered plan the engineers decided to work out a new one, actually not referring to Giprobum. See Kamskomu kombinatu 20 let, 63. from the institute`s library, but this story illustrates how strong and obvious the divides were between the institutions.
All this produced delays in launching the digester, first to the late 1951, then to 1952.
During the summer of 1951, the engineer-in-chief of the plant Konstantin Malyshkin corresponded with the Central Administration of Sulphite Cellulose Industry complaining about the lack of the machinery and electrical equipment needed for the upper section of the digester, despite regular requests to the central offices for industrial management. 61 The typical answer he received said that "there is no facilities in the warehouses" and at the same time a contradicting statement "take decisive measures to finish the works."
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The digester was finally completed in December 1952, but its functioning revealed some defects, mostly because of improper assembly. In particular, the testing devices did not work correctly because of mistakes made while it was being installed. The head of the State
Committee on Science and Technology, an organization responsible for science and development in the Soviet Union, wrote that "control of machinery was mostly done by eye and depended on the qualification and experience of operating personnel. 63 In 1953, the plant received additional funding of four hundred thousand rubles and in the following year, one hundred thousand more to finish the project and start industrial production. 64 In 1953, Malyshkin wrote to the Ministry that the digester was checked and installed, but again described technical problems. 65 In the following two years, engineers were involved in repair and attempts to overcome deficiencies in the equipment. The engineers also complained that the main reason for failures was because there was not space enough for the equipment, and they had to change the specifications of the initial project.
In 1955, the Zherebov`s digester was ready and continuous cooking as an industrial process was launched at the Enso plant. The process was now successful in terms of the technical stages. In the early 1956, a joint research group of engineers from the State Committee on Science and Technology, Ministry of Machine Making and Ministry of Paper and WoodWorking Industry traveled to the plant to check the digester. They concluded that construction was done mostly on the basis of existing materials taken from Svetogorsk: for example, three air funnels were borrowed from the other factories of the plant. The quality of pulp was low and did not meet the standards. 67 The delegates decreed that the digester had to be fixed in May 1956, but it was now important to introduce and investigate the continuous cooking digesters already invented and implemented in Sweden and Finland. They recommended the engineers in Svetogorsk intensify their study of a Kamyr digester already purchased from Finland in 1955, installed but still not functioning in the Marysky pulp and paper plant -one of the most updated Soviet enterprises, but located quite far from Svetogorsk, 50 km from Kazan. The committee said that it was now urgent to travel to Finland in order to examine their digesters and speed the research in the Soviet Union based on Western experience. It was also important, they said, to send some experienced engineers from Svetogorsk to the Marysky plant in other to assist launching a Kamyr digester there. Then, "it was needed to investigate thoroughly this digester and transform this experience into Zherebov`s parameters. 68 Last, they stressed the need to create
proper conditions for delay-free deliveries of raw materials to Svetogorsk.
This trip to check the plant seems to be among the last attempts from the leadership to introduce Zherebov`s method, and shows the turn on the part of the Ministry and related institutions toward transferring foreign technologies instead of developing domestic variants. A year before, in 1955, the Kamyr installation was purchased by the Soviet Union, its investigation was included into the chief plan of development and implementation of techniques. 69 The purchase of foreign digesters was evidence of path dependence and the result of the need to rapidly modernize the industry. This aim was officially stated by the post-Stalin leadership in 1955, but met the earlier requirements of the state.
We may assume that there were several trips to Finnish and Swedish factories in order to learn continuous cooking methods more thoroughly. Such trips were mostly organized in the He grounded his analysis on the inspection of the digester and compared it with data drawn from however, were the most important components in cooking pulp and had influence on the cooking process and the quality of the pulp mass. Chips had to be of uniform size between 15 and 20 centimeters, and have a minimal percentage of sawdust, bark and decay. 73 Nepenin stressed fairly that this had a negative impact on the mass and improper work of the digesters as well as required the reorganization in the work of enterprises responsible for supplies of wood chips.
In the early 1960s, some other Soviet plants used digesters of different constructionmodifications and analogous of Kamyr as well as alternative constructions also purchased from abroad. In particular, in 1962 a digester Pandia delivered by Parsons and Whittemore was used in the Chersonese pulp and paper enterprise in Crimea. Like Kamyr`s digester, this apparatus was thoroughly investigated by Soviet engineers, in particular after some defects were revealed.
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Local engineers replaced few technical components (feeders) with those produced in the Soviet Union because of splits, while the digester itself was rusted. 75 By the 1960s, thus, some replacement parts and modifications were already produced in the Soviet Union -however, it is not easy to say what mechanisms were still missing in the Soviet machinery production industry.
The destiny of Zherebov`s method in Svetogorsk was finally achieved in the mid-1950s, when industrial production by continuous cooking was launched. At that time the digester produced only 50 tons of pulp a day, a very small output. 76 Local engineers continued to experiment independently, not under the strong supervision of the responsible Ministry as before. The urgent state need to introduce the technology and produce better pulp had been fulfilled by using and improving upon foreign equipment while the domestic project failed to play a leading role in pulp production.
The mid-1950s was the time when different institutions were involved in the implementation of Zherebov`s method, publicly presented some general conclusions on the project. The reason was probably connected with that a Kamyr digester was transferred to the Soviet industry or at least this invention was now known in the USSR. In May, 1955 at the meeting of the Central Administration of Sulphite Cellulose Industry, vice-chairman P. Alekseev said that "it took more than twenty years to realize the idea of continuous cooking. They stressed that the Ministry issued more than twenty decrees on the method, as well as included it to the state plan on techniques five times, and the total cost of the project was more than 20 millions of rubles, but all this had a zero effect. 78 In addition, they stressed that in the 1950s, simultaneous with attempts to implement the method in Enso/Svetogorsk, similar research was launched abroad, and became widespread in Sweden, Finland and the United States. 79 In these two conclusions, we see responsibility put on the Ministry for its inability to supervise research, as well as the idea that Zherebov`s method came earlier than more successful foreign experiments. Accusing administrators of institutions, ministries or enterprises was a typical strategy in the industrial field and reproduced the idea of bureaucratic irresponsibility. 80 In this story, indeed, we see that the role of the Ministry in charge of the digesters was limited by decrees and resolutions, while the special board of the Central Administration of Sulphite Cellulose Industry should have provided expert and technical assistance. In many cases, however, neither this organization, nor the research office of Zherebov provided much assistance to the Enso/Svetogorsk engineers.
Despite the factual failure of the project, Zherebov was still considered a significant Soviet inventor and author of an excellent idea. Even before his death in 1958, various institutions published volumes devoted to his professional life. Some engineers, again, stressed that his ideas were introduced earlier than similar concepts in other countries, 81 while others argued that his innovation was adopted if not stolen by foreign engineers who could successfully adapt it for industrial production. 82 Zherebov had lived a long life, and was undoubtedly a brilliant researcher, theoretician, and a significant contributor to the Soviet pulp and paper industry. His activities established different institutions, produce excellent research on different aspects of wood processing, but his invention in pulp cooking was not realized as was expected.
Conclusions
Today the largest part of world pulp is made by continuous cooking. Although the batch method is still used by few enterprises, it is widely recognized as less economical than continuous pulping. The latter was a project initiated and improved in several countries in the 1930s, but the most recognizable inventor was Johan Richter, now considered the father of modern pulp industry.
The activities of Richer in Sweden in preparing and implementing the continuous cooker design were made in concert with the industrial company Kamyr, and after about ten years resulted in successful mass production. The outcome was a digester model purchased by many foreign countries and improved upon by engineers from different organizations. To some extent, this was a collective project, derived from close cooperation between Kamyr and Finnish, American and some other companies. At the same time, Richer's project launched many imitators and modifications among a number of foreign firms (such as Pandia). These projects, however, were not commonly used, and today Kamyr digesters produce 2/3 of all world pulp. 83 In the Soviet Union, slightly earlier than Richter`s idea, an even more technically ambitious digester was designed by engineer Leonid Zherebov. It seems that there were no close contacts among two inventors, and there were no interactions between Zherebov and other foreign engineers. Zherebov`s method was supported by the Soviet state, represented by the administration of the pulp and paper industry, which aimed to increase the production of highquality pulp. Zherebov's innovation was monopolized and politicized by the state, which took all control of implementation of the invention made secret. The digester constructed by Zherebov was to be set in Enso/Svetogorsk pulp and paper plant, a former Finnish enterprise which was the most updated among Soviet plants right before the war. The Ministry put the responsibility on the plant's engineers, despite their lack adequate parts (mostly not produced in the Soviet Union)
and expertise due to problems with educating specialists in continuous cooking. we see disorder in the network, mostly of organizational character.
One of the crucial reasons of failure laid in superfluous centralization of research. The state, through its ministries, took total control over implementation, from setting deadlines to the financial stimulation. The latter was important but not enough because many components of the system ranging from technical details to expertise were impossible to acquire.
Another reason of failure was created by strong barriers between different institutions within one technological space. This can be explained by competition between organizations which did not cooperate on the same project, but rather tried to make their own separately. Even on the scale of one country, there were separate and basically isolated endeavors both to work out new a Soviet method for pulp production usually built on Western experience. This might be the consequence of the secret character of the innovation in Enso/Svetogorsk which meant that the project was known only by a small group of engineers. At the same time, unlike the development of atomic bomb, a secret project which mobilized all necessary resources, in case of continuous cooking there was not a single leading expert but rather group of experts with different backgrounds. Engineers of the plant, however, tried to break the informational isolation by sending requests for cooperation, literature exchange and technical support with other institutions, but usually they were refused because of institutional barriers. In the history of continuous pulping we see competition arising from the different ministerial affiliations of the plants involved. In addition, there were several trips of engineers to plants in Finland and probably other counties including Sweden, in order to investigate foreign experience, and there were Kamyr and Pandia digesters bought and investigated in different Soviet factories. This was, however, a scattered effort with unconnected results, usually achieved by installing foreign equipment. In this respect, this story illustrates the path dependence of Soviet innovations and the typical result -switching to imports of similar technologies rather than using domestically designed variants. 84 The internal organization of the Soviet system as well as poor international connections created weak information flows. Both the Soviet way of management and Cold War import restrictions created informational isolation and lack of cooperation. At the same time both the Soviet leadership and Cold War aims explained the need of forced modernization and innovation.
Institutional obstacles also illustrate a significant gap between theory and practice when theoretical ideas were taken as a completed project ready for practical use. To a certain extent it was a culmination of long-time debates took place among scientists and engineers in many countries on the difference between theory and practice. 85 In reality, however, implementing
Zherebov`s innovation proves the connection between further academic research and developments in practice. The analysis of this article illustrated what Kendall Bailes said about scientists who came to factories from time to time in order to give instructions and left soon thereafter.
86
As a result, the implementation of Soviet continuous cooking took more than twenty years to develop, but unlike Kamyr`s (similarly long) experiment, it was not a successful part of industrial production. As a consequence, the analogous Western invention, first of all implemented by Kamyr, was widely adopted in the Soviet pulp and paper industry. The case of Zherebov`s method of continuous cooking shows the difficulties in overcoming reverse salients using domestic resources. Zherebov, who produced excellent theoretical work, did not participate fully in the industrial application of his design. The task was given to the engineers at the plant, without a strong technological or methodological support. After the first Kamyr and Pandia digesters were purchased and installed in Soviet enterprises, Soviet engineers, no longer suppressed by decrees, became (or at least tried to become) part of the international community of experts improving continuous pulp cooking. They examined foreign experience and developed to overcome some critical problems of the originally Swedish invention used in Soviet paper production.
In the late 1950s, Soviet industry experienced a large-scale economic increase. This euphoria made it possible to imagine that the country would enter the communism in a couple of military sector, but for many other fields, the flip side to the booming economy was the poor quality of products, technological backwardness, and extensive production. In the pulp and paper industry, this problem remained during the period of 1930s-1950s and arguably continues into the present.
